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Remembering past experiences: episodic memory, semantic memory and the 
epistemic asymmetry 
Christoph Hoerl 
 
There seems to be a distinctive way in which we can remember events we have 
experienced ourselves, which differs from the capacity to retain information about 
events that we can also have when we have not experienced those events ourselves 
but just learned about them in some other way. Psychologists and increasingly also 
philosophers have tried to capture this difference in terms of the idea of two different 
types of memory: episodic memory and semantic memory. Yet, the demarcation 
between episodic memory and semantic memory remains a contested topic in both 
disciplines, to the point of there being researchers in each of them who question the 
usefulness of the distinction between the two concepts.1 In this paper, I outline a new 
characterization of the difference between episodic memory and semantic memory, 
which connects that difference to what is sometimes called the ‘epistemic asymmetry’ 
between the past and the future, or the ‘epistemic arrow’ of time. My proposal will be 
that episodic memory and semantic memory exemplify the epistemic asymmetry in 
two different ways, and for somewhat different reasons, and that the way in which 
episodic memory exemplifies the epistemic asymmetry is manifest to the 
remembering subject in a way in which this is not the case for semantic memory.  
                                                
1 The episodic/semantic distinction originates with Tulving (1972), and has been refined by Tulving in 
a number of other works (Tulving, 1985, 2002; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). Rival ways of 
carving up the domain of memories are suggested, for instance, in Bernecker (2010) and Rubin and 
Umanath (2015). 
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I will start with a brief sketch of some of the existing work on the epistemic 
asymmetry, before turning to the question as to how exactly the idea of the epistemic 
asymmetry applies in the case of memory, and whether it might apply in a somewhat 
different form to different kinds of memory. The latter questions are, I believe, 
questions of independent interest that have to date been largely ignored in the 
literature on the epistemic asymmetry.2 However, as I will try to show, focusing on 
them can also help shed new light on some already existing characterizations of the 
contrast between episodic and semantic memory, for instance by providing the 
materials for fleshing out a sense in which episodic memory involves the preservation 
of a distinctive form of cognitive contact with events, as well as being past-directed in 
a way semantic memory isn’t. My primary aim is to set out an agenda for work in this 
neglected area of research, which is why some of my claims remain fairly 
programmatic at this stage.   
 
1. The epistemic asymmetry 
Philosophers working on the metaphysics of time often speak of a number of different 
asymmetries or ‘arrows’ that time seems to exhibit: that events become successively 
present in the direction of the future, rather than the past (the ‘arrow of time’), that 
entropy increases over time in the same direction (the ‘thermodynamic arrow’), or 
that causes always precede their effects (the ‘causal arrow’). The general question 
philosophers are typically interested in, in this context, is how these arrows might be 
related to one another, and in particular whether some of them might ground others in 
                                                
2 An exception is Huggett (forthcoming). He approaches questions about the connection between 
memory and the epistemic asymmetry largely from within the philosophy of physics. My main focus 
will be on epistemology. 
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a way that reveals as illusory certain asymmetries that time appears to exhibit, in the 
sense that they are due not actually to the metaphysical nature of time itself, but rather 
to some contingent features of how things are arranged in time.3  
 One of the asymmetries that philosophers have also discussed in this context 
concerns our knowledge of the past vs. our knowledge of the future, or what is 
sometimes called the ‘epistemic arrow’. There is clearly some sense in which our 
knowledge of the past is different from our knowledge of the future. Yet, as the 
following quote from David Albert brings out, it can be difficult to get a more precise 
fix on what exactly the difference at issue comes to: 
 
The sort of epistemic access we have to the past is different from the sort of 
epistemic access we have to the future. This (to put it mildly) nobody doubts. 
And nonetheless […], there is a vast […] literature nowadays about the 
alleged difficulty of specifying exactly what that difference is.  
It’s often pointed out, for example, that the difference certainly does 
not consist in our having knowledge of the past but none of the future. We do, 
after all, have knowledge of the future. We know (for example, and not less 
certainly than we know much of what we know of the past) that the sun will 
rise tomorrow.  
And if it’s said that we know more of the past than we do of the future, 
this seems (according to the usual way of talking) true enough, but (as it 
stands) not particularly informative— it seems to give us nothing at all that we 
                                                
3 On the importance of this distinction, see Price (1996, ch. 1). Different ways of fleshing out this 
general project are also suggested, e.g., in Horwich (1987), Ismael (2016), Callender (2017), and 
Fernandes (forthcoming).  
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can reason any further with, nothing that (as it were) we can sink our teeth 
into.  
Sometimes the focus is shifted to differences between the methods by 
which we come to know things about the past and the future. It’s said (more 
particularly) that there can be such things as records only of the past; but this 
is almost always immediately followed up with whining about the perennial 
elusiveness of exactly what it means to be a ‘record,’ and cluelessness follows 
again. (Albert, 2000, p. 113) 
 
I will discuss some of the issues alluded to in this passage in more detail in what 
follows. For the moment, I just want to note that what there has been to date by way 
of a philosophical discussion regarding the nature and source of the epistemic 
asymmetry has actually been conducted almost exclusively within the context of the 
philosophy of science and the metaphysics of time, rather than epistemology itself. 
Perhaps connected with this, existing discussions have also not primarily been 
concerned with the way in which knowledge or memory themselves may exhibit a 
temporal asymmetry. Rather, as indicated in the quote from Albert, the main focus 
has ultimately been on the general idea that we can have records of the past but not of 
the future, where such records have typically been conceived of as things that we can 
acquire knowledge from. 
Within the context of the present paper, there is only space for a very brief and 
crude sketch of some of the work that has been going on in this area. One useful 
starting point is the observation that there are ways we have of finding out about 
things in the world that do not display a past/future asymmetry. Laplace’s demon 
provides a vivid demonstration of how, under the assumption of determinism, both 
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past and future states of the world could, in principle, be inferred from the present 
state of the world using dynamical laws. We may not have the demon’s 
comprehensive knowledge of the present state of the world or his powers of deduction, 
and our world may also not be governed by strict determinism; yet, as long as we 
stick to the method of making inferences across time using dynamical laws, it is not 
obvious why these factors should differentially affect our ability to do so in the future 
and the past direction, respectively.  
The only thing that really breaks the parity between the past and the future and 
introduces the epistemic asymmetry, then, is that there is also a separate way in 
which we can have or obtain knowledge of non-present events or states of affairs, 
other than by applying dynamical laws, but it is only past events and states of affairs 
that this separate way can give us epistemic access to. This is what the idea that there 
can be records of the past, but not of the future, is trying to capture. To use a 
paradigmatic example discussed by Reichenbach (1956), a footprint on a beach can 
tell us of a person walking there in the past, but there is nothing that could tell us in an 
analogous way about future events.4  
Attempts to explain the existence of the epistemic asymmetry, thus understood, 
typically link it to another asymmetry in time: the thermodynamic asymmetry. This 
consists in the fact that the world, as we experience it, is marked by an earlier/later 
entropy-gradient. As Jill North (2011, p. 313) explains: 
 
Our everyday experience is largely of physical processes that occur in only 
one direction in time. A warm cup of coffee, left on its own in a cooler room, 
will cool down during the day, not grow gradually warmer. A box of gas, 
                                                
4 The example is originally from Schlick (1925). 
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opened up in one corner of a room, will expand to the volume of the room; an 
initially spread-out gas won’t contract to one tiny corner. A popsicle stick left 
out on the table melts into a hopeless mess; the hopeless mess sadly won’t 
congeal back into the original popsicle. 
    
Each of these processes is one of a transition from a lower-entropy state to a higher-
entropy state, and we only find these transitions occurring in one direction in time, 
and never in the reverse direction.5 Crudely, what is meant by an entropy-increase 
here is that, as it is sometimes put, a system in a state that exhibits a particular form of 
order (all the warmth concentrated in the coffee cup, all the gas condensed in the box 
in the corner, the popsicle occupying a small, well-defined place on the table) evolves 
into one that exhibits less order of this kind.  
 How might the thermodynamic asymmetry be connected to the epistemic 
asymmetry? Consider again the example of a footprint on a beach. The section of the 
beach containing the footprint is a physical system that, in virtue of containing the 
footprint, exhibits a (relatively) low state of entropy: the way the grains of sand are 
distributed involves a relatively sharp closed boundary between two regions: the 
region inside the footprint and the region outside it. Given what we have just said 
about the way such systems evolve over time, this is a type of state that we would not 
expect to arise spontaneously just from the movements of the grains of sand on the 
                                                
5 What, in turn, explains this fact is still the subject of considerable debate. There is a fairly 
straightforward statistical story to be told about why we should expect entropy to increase over time, 
i.e., why we should expect low-entropy states to evolve into higher-entropy states. The problem is that 
the relevant statistics are temporally neutral: the same considerations should lead us to think that 
entropy increases in the past direction too. There is therefore a second explanation needed as to what 
introduces the past/future asymmetry. See, e.g., Callender (2016) for discussion. 
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beach. Left on its own, we would expect the footprint to disappear after a while, as the 
sand gets blown around in the wind; we would never expect to see the reverse of this 
process. This is what makes the footprint, considered as a particular kind of physical 
arrangement, capable of acting as a record.6 What it records is an interaction between 
that section of the beach and some other physical system itself exhibiting a low state 
of entropy: a human walking along the beach. This is what the footprint is a record of, 
but, given the direction of the thermodynamic asymmetry, in so far as this is what is 
recorded by the footprint, it must be something that lies in the footprint’s past, rather 
than in its future.  
 Something broadly like this story is accepted in much of the current literature, 
although there have also been a number of criticisms that suggest that, at the very 
least, it needs to be refined if it is supposed to provide an accurate account, e.g., of the 
level of detailed knowledge we take ourselves to have about the past, and of the 
variety of ways in which we can derive inferences about the past from present 
evidence.7 I will not rehearse these existing debates in what follows. Rather, my focus 
will be on a different aspect in which this story, even if true, remains rather 
incomplete. As I want to argue, it gives us an account of only one type of 
                                                
6 Throughout this paper, I will use phrases such as ‘is a record of’ and also ‘remembers’ as factive, i.e. 
as implying veridicality (see also the focus on knowledge in what follows). My question is: In so far as 
there are such states as being a (veridical) record of something, or (veridically) remembering 
something, what constitutes something’s or someone’s being in them? I will set aside the existence of 
other, non-veridical states that we might, on occasion, be unable to distinguish from those veridical 
states, and the separate set of philosophical issues they might raise.  
7 For some challenges to this story, see, e.g., Earman (1974) and Horwich (1987). For a revision, 
according to which there is a more fundamental asymmetry that grounds both the epistemic asymmetry 
and the thermodynamic arrow, see Albert (2000).  
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phenomenon connected with the epistemic asymmetry, not least leaving out the 
particular aspect of the epistemic asymmetry that we are arguably most intimately 
acquainted with.   
 
2. The epistemic asymmetry and semantic memory 
Part of my aim in relating the distinction between episodic memory and semantic 
memory to the general issue of the epistemic asymmetry of time is to provide a 
taxonomy of several different types of ‘records’, all of which exhibit a type of 
past/future asymmetry, but with each of them doing so in a somewhat different form.8 
Or so I will argue.  
A first question to consider in this context is in what respects memories, in 
general, differ from phenomena such as the footprint on the beach. I will assume that, 
at some level of abstraction, memories, too, may be described as records, and there 
may also ultimately be a common underlying explanation, perhaps of the kind 
sketched in the previous section, as to why both memories and other types of records 
exhibit a past/future asymmetry (where the nature of this asymmetry is to be spelled 
out further for the case of memories in what follows). Yet, there is clearly also a sense 
in which we are dealing with phenomena of two somewhat different kinds.  
                                                
8 As indicated by the scare quotes, I am not entirely happy with this use of the word ‘record’. I need a 
word that generalizes over all the different particular phenomena that result in a past/future asymmetry 
in our epistemic standing, and I have chosen to go with the word ‘records’ as it is already being used in 
the existing literature on the epistemic asymmetry. Yet, it is also an important part of my argument that 
there are crucial differences between some of these phenomena, which I also take to be indicated by the 
fact that, e.g., a footprint on a beach is perhaps better described as a trace, and that memories, even if 
they can be described as records in some sense, are not necessarily memories of the thing they are a 
record of (as I will explain below).   
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One obvious way in which memories are different from phenomena such as 
the footprint on the beach is that the former are themselves epistemic states, they 
embody pieces of knowledge. The latter, by contrast are items from which pieces of 
knowledge about the past can be obtained, but doing so first requires the subject 
drawing an inference (e.g., from the existence of the footprint to the past presence of 
another person on the beach). One way of explaining this difference is in terms of the 
idea that memories, whilst falling under the general category of records, are records 
specifically of epistemic activity; even more specifically, they are records of the 
formation of the very epistemic state that the subject’s subsequent remembering 
consists in, her memory consisting precisely in the fact that it has been preserved.9 In 
so far as items such as the footprint on the beach also count as records, by contrast, 
they are typically records of non-epistemic activity. And even if some of them may, in 
some sense, also be described as records of epistemic activity – the knot I have put in 
my handkerchief to remind myself of something may perhaps qualify as some such – 
they are not themselves epistemic states formed by this activity.10  
                                                
9 For this reason, speaking of memories as a type of record is compatible with Dummett’s (1993) claim 
that that “[m]emory is not a source, still less a ground of knowledge: it is the maintenance of 
knowledge formerly acquired by whatever means.” It is plausible to think that things that can be a 
record of something can also, at the same time, be a record of a number of other things. In the case of 
memory, though, its being a record of the relevant event of knowledge-acquisition is what makes a 
memory a memory.  
10 This is not to rule out that states of objects outside a person’s body could, under suitable 
circumstances, form part of that person’s epistemic state. I take it whether they can, and, if so, under 
what circumstances, is precisely one of the things under discussion in debates about the ‘extended mind 
thesis’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). 
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The fact that memories themselves embody knowledge, whereas phenomena 
such as footprints on the beach are merely items from which knowledge may be 
obtained by inference, constitutes an important difference between the two.11 In the 
case of semantic memory, however, there is also a further important dimension of 
difference from the case of footprints. I have said that, like a footprint, semantic 
memories are records, though they differ from a footprint in being records specifically 
of epistemic activity. I have also said that semantic memories embody knowledge 
(rather than just serving as items from which knowledge can be derived). Yet, 
crucially, the knowledge that semantic memories embody is not knowledge of the 
epistemic activity they are records of. The knowledge they embody derives from that 
activity, but it is not knowledge about that activity. 
This becomes particularly clear when we consider that there are no restrictions 
regarding the tense of beliefs that can be stored in semantic memory. The astronomer 
who has figured out that there will be a lunar eclipse next week can retain this 
knowledge in semantic memory, but her memory is clearly not a record of that lunar 
eclipse, which is still to occur in the future. Rather, it is a record of her activity of 
having calculated the date of the eclipse. Similarly for memories of tenseless facts: 
After years of study, the mathematician may remember the Cauchy-Peano theorem, 
                                                
11 I have focused specifically on the contrast between these two categories of phenomena. A further 
category of records that I will leave to one side for present purposes are records involving 
representational media such as written words or images. Like the footprint, they are not by themselves 
epistemic states (though see the preceding footnote), but in other respects they might be thought to 
share more features with memories. For instance, it is not just knowledge about the past that we can 
obtain from written texts or images – a diary entry may inform me of an appointment next week, a map 
may show the course of next month’s marathon. As I will go on to discuss, semantic memory is 
similarly not restricted to retaining knowledge just about the past.  
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but her memory is clearly not a record of the theorem in the sense of that term 
associated with the epistemic past/future asymmetry. This means that in the case of 
semantic memories with a past-tensed content, too, it is important to distinguish 
between the question as to what is being remembered, i.e. what the content of the 
memory is, and what the memory is a record of.   
There is also an important consequence of this when it comes to specifying the 
precise sense in which semantic memory exhibits an epistemic asymmetry. Crucially, 
there is no built-in past/future asymmetry in the knowledge semantic memories can 
embody. Any such asymmetry is at best a quantitative one – i.e. one concerning the 
amount of knowledge retained that concerns the past and the future, respectively – 
and, where such a quantitative asymmetry exists, it is (with one exception that I will 
get to) inherited from an asymmetry connected to the particular epistemic activity the 
relevant semantic memories are records of, rather than being explained by the nature 
of semantic memory itself. Thus, it would come as no surprise, for instance, that an 
archaeologist’s semantic memory contains a great deal of knowledge about the past, 
since the main method of inquiry they pursue in their professional life consists in 
interpreting archaeological records, which are evidence only of past, and not future, 
events. In an exactly analogous way, though, the semantic memory of a scientist 
programming the future flight path of an interplanetary space probe could be expected 
to contain a great deal of knowledge of the future, because of the many calculations 
she has carried out to determine the future orbits of the planets to be encountered by 
the probe on its mission.      
   The one exception that is probably worth mentioning separately here are 
semantic memories about events that are in fact based on our own past experiences of 
these events. Amnesic patients often retain knowledge about events that have 
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happened to them, even though they are unable to recollect them in episodic 
memory,12 and whilst some of that knowledge may have been acquired, say, through 
later testimony, there is no reason to rule out that some of it might also trace back to 
their own experiences of the relevant events, even though the only form in which it is 
now still available is that of a semantic memory.  
In this sort of case, the time of the event the memory is concerned with in fact 
coincides with that of the epistemic activity it is a record of – a feature which, as I 
will suggest, semantic memories with this specific sort of history share with episodic 
memories. And, of course, semantic memories with this specific sort of history are, in 
virtue of this and given the general temporal asymmetry of records, restricted to 
carrying information about past events. Yet, crucially, because the knowledge 
regarding the relevant events has only been retained in the form of semantic memories, 
there is an important sense in which the epistemic asymmetry is no more manifest in 
these memories than it is in other semantic memories concerning past events. 
Specifically, the fact that the time of the event the memory is concerned with 
coincides with that of the epistemic activity it is a record of is not itself manifest as 
part of the memory itself. It is in just this respect, I now want to argue, that there is a 
crucial difference between semantic and episodic memory. 
 
3. Episodic memory and the epistemic asymmetry 
Just as blanket statements to the effect that we know more about the past than we do 
about the future are of little help in trying to explicate the epistemic asymmetry (if not 
                                                
12 Patient KC, for instance, whilst being described as having lost all capacity for episodic recollection, 
can describe a number of aspects of his life before the accident that brought about his amnesia. See 
Craver, Kwan, Steindam, and Rosenbaum (2014). 
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outright false), so it is with another sort of blanket statement sometimes made in this 
context, viz. that we can remember the past but not the future. As should be clear 
from what I said in the previous section, when it comes to semantic memories, their 
contents can as easily range over the future as over the past, or they can even 
comprise tenseless truths such as those of mathematics. Semantic memories do 
exhibit the epistemic asymmetry, in so far as they fall under the general category of 
being records, but their doing so does not show up in the knowledge they can 
embody; it is not manifest in the knowledge possession of which having the relevant 
memories consist in.   
Yet there is arguably one specific form of memory to which the statement that 
we can remember the past but not the future does apply, and this is what is commonly 
referred to as episodic memory. To a first approximation, episodic memory is the type 
of memory that allows us to remember particular events themselves, as they happened, 
in a way that is different from simply retrieving information about them of the kind 
that can also be retained in semantic memory. And, in contrast to semantic memory, it 
seems to be the knowledge that is retained in epistemic memory itself that exhibits a 
temporal asymmetry. We can remember events in this specific way only if they have 
already happened. Moreover, it is not just de facto the case that we can have episodic 
memories only of past events, and not of future ones; this is also something that is 
obvious to the remembering subject. Episodic recollection itself seems to involve a 
distinctive awareness, on the part of the subject, of the remembered events as lying in 
the past, in virtue of the particular type of mental state it is.13  
                                                
13 There are certain approaches to episodic memory that allow for the possibility of cases in which 
subjects are in fact recollecting a past event, even though it doesn’t even seem to them that they are 
representing a past event – the de facto obtaining of a causal connection between the subject’s present 
 14 
As should be clear from what has been said so far, this specific way in which 
episodic memory exhibits a past/future asymmetry cannot simply follow from the 
type of epistemic asymmetry also exhibited by semantic memory. Neither, it seems, 
can it simply derive from the one at issue in our capacity to make inferences about 
past events based on phenomena such as footprints on a beach. So we need to ask 
what grounds this more specific type of asymmetry. 
Above, I suggested a general characterization of the distinctive sense in which 
memories are records, according to which what is distinctive about memories is that 
they are records specifically of epistemic activity; and even more specifically, they are 
records of the formation of the very epistemic state that the subject’s subsequent 
remembering consists in, her memory consisting precisely in the fact that it has been 
preserved. In the case of semantic memories, however, I also suggested that, whilst 
they are records of epistemic activity, the knowledge they embody is not knowledge 
of that epistemic activity; what is retained in memory is rather just the epistemic state 
                                                                                                                                      
mental state and a specific past experience of theirs being supposedly sufficient to make it a case of 
episodic recollection (see, e.g., C. B. Martin and Deutscher (1966)). I argue against this way of 
conceptualizing episodic memory elsewhere (see Hoerl, 2014a). Another hypothetical situation in 
which one might claim that somebody who recollects an event in episodic memory need not 
necessarily think of the event as lying in the past is that of a person travelling back into the past but 
remembering events from the period in the future before they stepped into the time machine. As David 
Lewis (1976) has shown, though, cases of time travel force us to make a distinction between what he 
calls ‘personal time’ and what he calls ‘external time’, and whilst it is true that the time traveller might 
think of some events she remembers as being located in the future with respect to external time, this is 
compatible with thinking that she will nevertheless also be aware of them lying in the past with respect 
to her personal time (i.e. they belong to a period of her life when she was biologically younger). I am 
grateful to a referee for prompting me to clarify these points.  
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that was formed in this activity, which can have a variety of different contents, 
depending on what the relevant epistemic activity was. 
 What I now want to suggest is that, whilst what is retained in episodic memory, 
too, is an epistemic state that was formed through the epistemic activity the memory 
is a record of, in episodic memory that epistemic state, at the same time, constitutes 
knowledge of that epistemic activity. Thus, having an episodic memory is both a 
matter of having a record of past epistemic activity and having knowledge concerning 
that past epistemic activity; these two things coincide in episodic memory in a way in 
which this is not the case, I have suggested, for semantic memory. Moreover, this 
means that, in episodic memory, the epistemic asymmetry is manifest to the 
remembering subject in a way in which this is not the case for semantic memory. 
 At first, this characterization of episodic memory might appear in tension with 
the initial one that I gave at the beginning of this section, where I described it as the 
capacity to remember particular past events themselves, as they happened. But I think 
the two characterizations can be made compatible with each other, and indeed we can 
draw an explanatory link between them, if we think of episodic memory as preserving 
knowledge of events by preserving knowledge of our experiences of those events. 
That is to say, episodic memories embody knowledge of the epistemic activity 
through which they themselves were formed in the more specific sense that what is 
remembered in episodic memory is one’s experience of an event, and it is in virtue of 
remembering that experience that the subject also remembers the event itself in the 
distinctive way involved in episodic recollection.  
 Similar sorts of considerations are also sometimes framed in terms of the idea 
that episodic memories are subject to a ‘previous awareness condition’ – i.e. that we 
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can only recall events in episodic memory that we have experienced ourselves.14 Yet 
it is not obvious that existing accounts of episodic memory can give a satisfactory 
explanation as to why this condition holds in the distinctive way in which it holds for 
episodic memory. For instance, an explanation in terms of the causal processes 
underlying episodic memory seems unable to do justice to the fact that it seems 
introspectively obvious to us that the condition holds. Similarly, simply writing such 
an introspective awareness into the definition of what episodic memory is (as, e.g., 
Owens (1996) suggests) seems ad hoc. What we need is an explanation of how the 
fact that episodic memory manifestly involves retaining knowledge about past 
experiences makes possible the distinctive awareness of events we can enjoy in 
episodic memory, rather than just being an add-on to it.  
I think a more promising approach to this issue is to consider exactly what 
kind of knowledge about experience episodic memory, distinctively, might be said to 
preserve. In particular, I want to consider a suggestion made by Matthew Soteriou 
(2008), according to which episodic memory involves retention of knowledge of our 
own past experiences more specifically in the sense that what is preserved in episodic 
memory is knowledge of ‘what it was like’ to experience the remembered event. 
What is retained in episodic memory, in other words, is knowledge specifically of the 
conscious experiential character of the relevant past experience.15  
                                                
14 The term ‘previous awareness condition’ was coined by Shoemaker (1970), though the idea goes 
back at least as far as Locke (1690) and Reid (1785). For discussion, see also M. G. F. Martin (2001).  
15 This claim should be distinguished from the claim that the remembering subject’s current mental 
state must faithfully resemble her past experience in all respects before she can be said to have such 
knowledge. For instance, it is at least not obvious that one cannot be said to remember what it was like 
to experience a certain event if one remembers it from an ‘observer’ rather than a ‘field’ perspective. 
See also McCarroll and Sutton (2017) on related issues.  
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How might thinking about episodic memory as preserving knowledge 
specifically about what it was like to experience certain past events help make 
intelligible also the idea that it involves a distinctive way of retaining knowledge of 
past events, as well as exhibiting the epistemic asymmetry in a distinctive way that is 
manifest to the remembering subject herself? Here I think it might help to draw on 
some ideas in the existing literature on consciousness on the special status of 
knowledge regarding the conscious experiential character of experience. One issue 
frequently noted in this literature is that there seems to be an essential connection 
between such knowledge and first-hand experience: The only epistemic means by 
which we can come by knowledge of the conscious experiential character of an 
experience is by having the experience ourselves.16 The point here is also sometimes 
made by saying that there is a particular way in which experience is epistemically 
transformative (Paul, 2014): It furnishes us with knowledge of a kind that we have no 
other epistemic means of obtaining – knowledge which itself is sometimes described 
in the vocabulary of ‘experience’, as in the in the notion of experiences which it is 
possible to have and accumulate a stock of.  
The existing literature in this area is mostly concerned with knowledge of the 
conscious experiential character of types of experience, and the role experience itself 
plays in such knowledge. But what I want to suggest is that the points made in that 
literature also have important implications for our knowledge of the conscious 
experiential character of token experiences, in a way that lets us understand the 
                                                
16 Discussion of this point is particular prominent in the context of work on the so-called ‘ability 
hypothesis’, according to which phenomenal knowledge consists in a particular form of practical 
knowledge (Lewis, 1990; Nemirow, 1990). But I think the latter should be seen as a further claim, 
intended as an explanation of why the point holds. 
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special status of episodic memory, if it is construed as the retention specifically of 
such knowledge.17 Consider a scenario of a type described by A. J. Ayer, in which 
someone describes an incident in your past of which they were a witness. In this sort 
of case, there is a possibility that you may believe the other person, and that you may 
even be able to visualize the event based on your general knowledge, but without 
remembering it. As Ayer points out, though, in this situation it can also happen that 
you suddenly start remembering again. 
 
The transformation may be uncertain. One says ‘I do dimly recollect it’, being 
still not quite sure whether one does or not […]. But it may also be that all of a 
sudden the event comes back to one quite clearly. One has no doubt that one 
remembers it. (Ayer (1956, p. 146) See also Evans (1982, p. 308), Campbell 
(2001, p. 173)) 
 
What I am suggesting is that we can understand this situation as one in which the 
subject recovers the retained knowledge of a particular experiential episode and its 
conscious experiential character as that episode.18 Why think that the capacity to 
retain knowledge of this type constitutes a separate, distinctive category of memory? 
Note that, because of the indispensable role that experience itself plays in equipping 
us with that knowledge in the first place, in so far as the subject retrieves that 
knowledge, its source is, at same time, obvious to the subject herself – it is not 
knowledge which, like the knowledge retrieved from semantic memory, can leave its 
source open; it is knowledge that the subject could only obtain through going through 
                                                
17 For further discussion of related ideas, see also Hoerl (forthcoming). 
18 Compare here also Martin & Deutscher’s (1966) discussion of the phenomenon of ‘prompting’.  
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the experience itself. And it is in virtue of this that the memory can be said to involve 
a distinctive form of knowledge of the subject’s particular past experience itself, and 
by extension of the event it was an experience of, as it happened. As we might also 
put it, the knowledge about a past event that is retained in episodic memory is the 
knowledge of just how our encounter with that event has added to our stock of 
experiences, and it is in virtue of this that it constitutes knowledge of that particular 
event itself and manifestly locates it in our past. 
Thus, there is a specific way in which episodic memory exhibits an epistemic 
asymmetry, which is grounded not just in the fact that episodic memories fall under 
the general characterization of a record, but in something specifically to do with the 
knowledge that is retained in episodic memory, i.e. the fact that episodic memory is 
the retention of knowledge of what it was like to experience the remembered event, 
the only epistemic means of acquiring which is through the experience itself.19 As we 
might also put it, the distinctive way in which episodic memories put us in touch with 
particular events and locates them in the past is rooted in the fact that it is memory for 
the particular epistemic transformation we underwent when we experienced the event 
and learnt what it was like to experience it – a type of knowledge we could only 
obtain on that occasion. This is why, in episodic memory, the time of the event the 
memory embodies knowledge of and the time it is a record of coincide in a way that is 
transparent to the remembering subject herself. 
 
 
                                                
19 Saying that this constitutes a distinct sense in which episodic memory exhibits an epistemic 
asymmetry is compatible with it too having a deeper grounding in whatever asymmetry grounds the 
general asymmetry of records, e.g., the thermodynamic asymmetry. 
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4. Coda: Episodic memory and time 
I have sketched a characterization of the difference between episodic and semantic 
memory based on the idea that, whilst they both exemplify the epistemic asymmetry 
of time, each of them does so in a somewhat different way. Furthermore, I have also 
suggested that both forms of memory, in turn, exemplify the epistemic asymmetry in 
a way that differs from the way in which this is the case for records such as a footprint 
on a beach.  
 As I already hinted at towards the beginning of this chapter, interest in the 
epistemic asymmetry in recent metaphysics and philosophy of science is mainly 
driven by the ambition to give an account of the origins of this asymmetry (along 
perhaps with further asymmetries in our thinking about time that may be grounded in 
it) that is compatible with the idea that the fundamental dynamical laws that govern 
our universe are time-symmetric, as current physics suggests.20 More specifically, the 
core agenda in this context is typically that of unmasking a pervasive tendency we 
seem to have towards thinking of temporal asymmetries such as the epistemic arrow 
as being due to the metaphysical nature of time itself. If what I have said in this paper 
is along the right lines, might it also perhaps be able to contribute to this unmasking 
project in a new way? I will conclude with some brief remarks on this issue, which 
are admittedly even more speculative than what I have said so far. 
 Contrary to the four-dimensionalist view of the universe suggested by modern 
physics, our everyday understanding of time conceives of time as completely different 
                                                
20 At least by and large. There seems to be a breakdown of complete time-reversal invariance in the 
interaction between certain sub-atomic particles. Even if this is so, however, it is far from clear how 
this might explain the existence of the relevant asymmetries on the level of our everyday experience. 
See also Wallace (2013). 
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from space. However, there are several, potentially separable, dimensions of this 
perceived difference, which is part of the reason why metaphysical accounts of time 
that diverge from the four-dimensionalist picture come in several different flavours, 
depending on which of those dimensions of difference they foreground, such as 
presentism, the ‘growing block’ view, or the ‘moving spotlight’ view.21 Put briefly, 
we may identify three such dimensions of difference as follows: that the present 
moment in time is somehow special, that there is a fundamental difference between 
the past and future, and that there is an irreversible ‘passage’ or ‘flow’ of time. What I 
now wish to suggest, as against the background of the preceding discussion, is that the 
epistemic asymmetry might in fact contribute to our everyday picture of time in two 
somewhat different ways, connected to two different such ingredients.  
 The epistemic asymmetry exhibited by records generally, i.e. the fact that we 
can have records only of the past and not of the future, is arguably one source of the 
idea that the past is fundamentally different from the future. Some work may be 
required to spell out in detail how exactly it gives rise to this idea, but there seems to 
be some intuitive sense in which we tend to think of the reason why we have records 
of the past but not of the future in terms of ideas such as the past is ‘fixed’ whereas 
the future is ‘open’, or that the past is real but the future isn’t.  
To get right the particular way in which we tend to think of the future as ‘open’ 
and the past as ‘fixed’, however, it seems we also need to appeal to the somewhat 
separate, if connected, idea of an irreversible ‘passage’ or ‘flow’ of time that turns 
what first belongs to the open future into something that then belongs to the fixed past. 
And here we can perhaps see a separate role specifically for episodic memory to play 
                                                
21 For an overview and discussion of these accounts see, e.g., Miller (2013).  
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in our everyday understanding of time.22 In this paper, I sought to identify a 
distinctive way in which episodic memory exhibits an epistemic asymmetry, in 
addition to the asymmetry that comes with memories belonging to the general 
category of a record. I traced this distinctive way in which episodic memory exhibits 
an epistemic asymmetry back to the particular kind of knowledge that is retained in 
episodic memory, namely knowledge of what it was like to experience the 
remembered event – or, as I have also put it, knowledge of the particular epistemic 
transformation that experiencing the event consisted in. What is special about this 
kind of knowledge, I argued, is that it is only the experience itself that can equip me 
with it, which can explain why, in episodic memory, it is transparent to the 
remembering subject that the time of the event the memory embodies knowledge of 
and the time it is a record of coincide. 
Implicit in these considerations, I believe, is the thought of form of 
irreversibility time has for us, from our epistemic point of view, that is specifically 
associated with the fact that we can engage in episodic recollection. To have the 
knowledge of what a particular experience is like, we must first wait until we undergo 
that experience, after which the knowledge is retained in episodic memory. That time 
is, in this sense, irreversible from our epistemic point of view is not just a thought that 
we apply in our thinking about the past. It can also play a crucial role in our thinking 
about the future. Experiences stay with us, and deciding about the future is in part a 
matter of deciding on what experiences we want to look back on.23 24 
                                                
22 For a related argument, see also Hoerl (2014b). 
23 This is an important theme in Paul (2014, 2015). See also Hoerl and McCormack (2016). 
24 Work on this chapter was supported by AHRC grant AH/P00217X/1. For comments on earlier 
versions, I am grateful to Patrick Burns, Alison Fernandes, Teresa McCormack, and two anonymous 
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referees, as well as to audiences at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the European Society of Philosophy 
and Psychology and a meeting of the Warwick Mind and Action Research Seminar. 
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